

# ENERGY ARENA IN SOUTH EAST EUROPE and TURKISH-RUSSIAN ENERGY COOPERATION


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## Turkey is at the crossroads of consumption and production: a natural bridge.

### Gas Production




Source: BP Statistical Review 2013

- Even though Turkey is limited in primary energy resources and is dependent on imported energy, it acts as a bridge between the world's crucial supply and demand regions.

- Having a position central to the regions of Europe, the Balkans, the Aegean, the Black Sea, the Caucasus-Caspian Basin and Central Asia, Turkey is a natural transit country for maritime and pipeline transportation of gas and oil.

### Petroleum Production



- Turkey's position is critical for the export and import of petroleum as it straddles the demand-rich west to supply-rich east.


# Fundamentals of Turkish Energy Policy

## TURKEY GEOGRAPHICALLY BETWEEN TWO WORLDS

- \* In its East producers/exporters; In its West consumers/importers
- \* In its East monopolistic markets; In its West liberalized energy markets
- \* In its East mainly autocratic regimes; In its pluralistic democracies

Turkish oil, gas production is not significant and energy is the main cause of high current account deficit. Turkey will remain as a net importer of hydrocarbons and dependent on Russia, Iran for foreseeable future.

International pipeline projects are seen as a tool to balance this overdependence



**Northern Corridor**


- 1 Nord Stream 1 & 2
- 2 Yamal-Europe
- 3 Northern Lights
- 4 Brotherhood
- 5 Soyuz



Capacity

**Southern Corridor**


- 6 TurkStream
- 7 Blue Stream
- 8 TANAP / TAP



Capacity

**Routes to China**

- 9 Turkmenistan–China
- 10 Power of Siberia
- 11 Altai



Capacity

# TURKEY-EU-RUSSIA Energy Triangle IN SEE

- ▶ **EU:** Diversification of Supply --- Diminishing Overdependence on Russia: “Southern Gas Corridor”
- ▶ **Russia:** Diversification of Route ---- Avoiding transit risks and Consolidation of Gazprom’s position in Europe: “South Gas Ring” IGAs
- ▶ **Turkey:** Diversification of Supply--- Geographical Position Seeking Influence with new Allies: Participation into East-West Energy Corridor and North-South energy projects

## RUSSIAN PIPELINES to EUROPE

- ▶ **2020 Forecast =200+ bcm (Increasing Competition due to LNG)**
- ▶ Nord Stream: 55 bcm (OPAL+NEL)
- ▶ Yamal: 33 bcm
- ▶ Northern Light:
- ▶ Blue Stream: 16 bcm
- ▶ Total: 126 bcm
- ▶ **“Turkish Stream 2?”: + 17.5 bcm**
- ▶ **“Nord Stream 2”: 55 bcm**

- The first option for Gazprom before it focuses on second line of Turkish Stream was to win some concessions from the EU for the higher utilization rate of already constructed OPAL pipeline and/or the realization of Nord Stream 2 project.
- OPAL resolution was reached. Polish regulatory and political objection to NS 2 could be neutralized with Trump effect.
- Nord Stream 2 (55 bcm/a) plus just the first line of Turkish Stream (15.75 bcm/a) is more than enough to replace the Ukrainian GTS by 2020. If half of NS 2 + 1 TS, means: There will be small transit UGTS
- In this framework, if only the first line is constructed, then Turkish Stream will evolve into another Blue Stream: It means only a bilateral pipeline between Turkey and Russia under the Black Sea just to feed the Turkish domestic market.
- The second option for Gazprom is to focus on building both lines. Under this scenario, Turkey will become an energy corridor for Russia, not a gas hub, under the current agreement. However, Gazprom will have to agree with EC for gas sales within EU.

## GREEK STAKES ON REGIONAL GAS PROJECTS

### MACROECONOMIC SNAPSHOT

#### RUSSIAN GAS PACKAGE & GREEK ECONOMY POTENTIAL IMPACT

Transit charges: € 380m/yr  
Gas bill discounts: € 100m/yr

#### RUSSIAN GAS PACKAGE NET PRESENT VALUE


€ 4.8bn

#### II ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMME

€ 164.5bn

#### RUSSIAN GAS PACKAGE IMPACT ON GREEK TOT, ANNUAL GOV.NT SPENDING

0,5%





- Turkey, which is fluctuating between Western supported East-West and Moscow based North-South axes energy projects, is seen as a corridor for all.
- Initially, under the European concept of a Southern Gas Corridor the role of Turkey was reduced to that of a gas corridor for *consumers* (European Union). More recently, because of a changing geopolitical environment and political choice by Ankara, Turkey is now being developed into a gas corridor for *producers* (Russia and Azerbaijan).
- Ironically, Russia seems to have a bigger say in the European concept of a Southern Gas Corridor which is now being 'Eurasianised'. Consequently, a new energy triangle is being formed between Azerbaijan, Russia and Turkey in which the first two are suppliers and the latter is corridor in energy infrastructure of the region. Therefore, there is not any competition between Azerbaijan and Russia unlike opposite claims. Baku will reach TAP through TANAP and Moscow can reach Poseidon or Bulgaria via Turkish Stream.

# A repeat of European Hybrid Model in 2020s?

## Gas Imports of Turkey (bcm) and LTCs (S.Karbuz)



# TIMELINE OF TURKISH-RUSSIAN ENERGY COOPERATION

## TURKEY - RUSSIA: ENERGY DEALS AND EXPORT VOLUMES

**1970-1985:** Several Agreements Regarding Scientific and Technical Cooperation on Turkey Projects (Seydisehir, Orhaneli, Iskenderun...)

**2010:** Intergovernmental Agreement Regarding the Construction of Akkuyu Nuclear PP (4800 MW)  
Electricity Prod.: **2020 (Est.)**

**1984:** First Intergovernmental Agreement Regarding Supplies of Russian Natural Gas to Turkey (6 bcm/year)  
Gas Flow: **1988**

**2001:** Liberal Natural Gas Market Law of Turkey (Contract Release Programme)  
First Release: **2007 (4 bcm)**  
Second Release: **2012 (6 bcm)**

**2014:** Initial Talks on the Turkish Stream Project  
Gas Flow: **2020 (Est.)**

**1996:** Contract Between Turkish BOTAS and Russian Gazexport (additional 8 bcm/year)  
Gas Flow: **1998**

Turkey's repayment by goods (tobacco, hazelnut, citrus fruits, raisin, olive, fruit and vegetable, cotton, leather) instead of cash

**1997:** Intergovernmental Agreement Regarding the Second Pipeline Blue Stream (16 bcm/year)  
Gas Flow: **2002**



**Okan Yardimci, July 2015**  
(Data source : Turkish Statistic Institution, Ministry of Economy, Official Gazette)

## A MORE ACTIVE ROSNEFT IN TURKISH ENERGY MARKET?

- ▶ There is lack of big energy cooperation between ROSNEFT and Turkish Companies.
  - ▶ Rosneft is active in Northern Iraq's Oil Development
- ▶ Big business opportunities could be established between Russia and Turkey in which oil and oil products' sectors are growing. (TUPRAS and Star (SOCAR) Refineries)
- ▶ **Teşekkürler!**
- ▶ **Спасибо!**
- ▶ **Thank you!**