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What has happened since the last meeting

Geopolitics

- Russia vs. the "IMF World"
- Currency flux (Swiss frank, USD/EUR, Ruble)

Infrastructure

- SouthStream out
- TAP TANAP fixed
- Alternatives discussed

Oil

- Oil price dropped down more than 50%
- Some shale oil producers are below breakeven
- Investments in non-conventional and offshore dropping

GACs contribution and value

Remember the slide from September 2014 presentation?

Preceding the High/Low Road

- · Drastic deterioration of geopolitical relations: EU-Russiua
 - From 4-regional EU-28 model to 8-regional model
 - Motivation: ranging by access to gas infrastructure, renewables potential and green policy compliance
- · Threats to logistics of Russian gas delivery
 - Ukrainian PM announcement of "closing the transit for Russian gas"
 - · Continued blockade of the South Stream
 - Careless policy and political messages, leading to additional escalation

GAC is needed now more than ever in its history

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WE ARE HAPPY GAC IS BACK!

Oil: capacity vs. price analysis


OPEC Spare Capacity, its Proportion of World Oil Demand & Brent Price (real 2015 terms, reverse axis)



Source: Prices History - Thomson Datastream, Forecast - Wood Mackenzie: OPEC Capacity - Wood Mackenzie


Source: Wood Mackenzie, 2015

Oil: new price curves to introduce to the study




Source: Wood Mackenzie, 2015

Given all that, we chose these oil and gas scenarios




Oil price fixed at 40, 50, 60 and 80 \$/bbl for 3 years. Afterwards approaches the earlier forecasts

Gas prices are modeled with a linear regression coefficient, by country of origin with a lag of 1 year relative to oil prices



Shaping scenario filed: dimensions and stress-points

Essential Output: Gas TPES, Imports, Bill, ...



We were seeking answers to the following questions

- How would the EU energy system react to Short term, foreseeable shocks in oil price (3 years downtime, slow recovery)
- How would the current EU model (2015 research state) react in extreme high and extreme low gas prices? If results are valid, what vectors do these extreme scenarios indicate for the EU and exporters (including Russia)
- What would it mean for natural gas in terms of :
 - Indigenous EU production
 - Use in power generation
 - Final use
 - Exporters revenue and infrastructure incentives
- What additional impacts on the EU energy system would the CO2 reduction policies (targets and taxes) deliver?
- Finally, is this crisis bearable for the EU and the gas exporting countries?


- Planned and protocolled by GAC changes to the Integrated Modeling Environment
 - Supply modeling
 - Demand modeling
 - Regional structure
- Introduction of the scenario field
- First glance at the results: high aggregation figures




European Regions



Gas Import Routes




Indigenous Gas Connections



Prices and Restrictions


	Targe		Oil Price
	ts	tax	trajectory
REF-15	YES	NO	60 \$/b
			80 \$/b
REF-14	YES	NO	(old)
			, ,
OIL 40	YES	NO	40 \$/b
OIL 50	YES	NO	50 \$/b
OIL 80	YES	NO	80 \$/b
TAX 20	NO	YES	60 \$/b
TAX 30	NO	YES	60 \$/b
TAX 40	NO	YES	60 \$/b
			·
REF TAX			
<mark>20</mark>	YES	YES	60 \$/b
REF TAX			
<mark>30</mark>	YES	YES	60 \$/b
REF TAX			
<mark>40</mark>	YES	YES	60 \$/b
OIL40			
TAX30	NO	YES	40 \$/b
OIL50			
TAX30	NO	YES	50 \$/b
OIL80			
TAX30	NO	YES	80 \$/b
No			
Targets	NO	NO	60 \$/b
Cheap			
Gas	YES	NO	61 \$/b
Expensiv			
e Gas	YES	NO	62 \$/b




The Scenarios

		oil price [Euro/boe]							
		cheap	40	50	60	80	expens		
	target	cheapG as	oil40	oil50	REF	oil80	expenGa s		
×	20				NoCO2limit2 0				
CO2 tax	30				NoCO2limit3 0				
J	40				NoCO2limit4 0				
	nolim		Oil40Noli m	Oil50Noli m		Oil80Noli m			
	Additiona	I scenarios:			Africa				
					FreeScen NoCrisis				


Total Gas Imports to the EU 2015 to 2025 [bcm]



Gas Imports from Russia 2015 to 2025 [bcm]



Value of Gas from Russia 2015 to 2025 [bill EURO]




In Numbers for 2015 to 2025

	Total ([bcm]								
	oil price [Euro/boe]								
		cheap	40	50	60	80	expens		
	target	6518	5396	5365	5348	5285	4012		
ä	20				5283				
CO2 tax	30				5387				
$\frac{9}{2}$	40				5444				
	nolim		5386	5384		5317			

	Gas Imports from Russia [bcm]							
	oil price [Euro/boe]							
		cheap	40	50	60	80	expens	
	target	2642	2084	2074	2069	2039	896	
CO2 tax	20				2034			
	30				2075			
\mathcal{S}	40				2095			
	nolim		2063	2064		2041		

Value of Gas from Russia [billEuro]									
		oil price [Euro/boe]							
			cheap	40	50	60	80	expens	
		target	307	519	544	573	633	422	
	tax	20				563			
	2021	30				572			
	\mathcal{S}	40				577			
		nolim		510	538		633		

Gas Use [bcm/year] (cheap and expensive gas scenarios)



- Oil market fundamentals and surrounding factors leading to the current crisis
- Detail results overview on the aggregated EU level
- Stress-testing: extreme scenarios for model



The international oil market - wither price of oil

Lesson 1:

• "The probability of occurrence of predicted energy trends is inversely proportional to the intensity of the underlying consent." (Henry Linden)

Lesson 2:

 No running out in sight - Peak oil debunked. Note: Oil use will peak eventually but nor for reasons of scarcity

Lesson 3:

 Economically recoverable reserves = f(market price, technology, demand, politics)

The international oil market - wither price of oil

- Lesson 4:
 - Prices = f(demand, spare production capacity, investment, geopolitics (energy security), expectation [speculation])
- Lesson 5:
 - Prices ≠ costs short run versus long-run marginal cost


Oil market today

- Stagnating demand at best due to overall sluggish economic development
- Shale oil increased US oil output by 80% or 4 mmb/d versus 2008 (remember North Sea & Mexico in the early 1980s)
- Correction of the perverse situation that the lowest cost producers are the swing supplier
- Accelerating decline in rig counts for shale oil development & a general cut-back in capital outlays
- Some oil producing countries can weather the storm others encounter severe financial and budget shortages
- Volatile financial markets & exchange rates
- Uncertainty with respect to future environmental regulation


Oil market rebound – Critical issues

- Change in Saudi leadership
- Turmoil in Nigeria
- Libya promising development halted
- Iran and Iraq
- Offshore developments around the world
- Short-run prices likely to stay low until new investments required
- Estimated transfer of \$1.5 \$2 trillion from oil exporting countries to oil importing countries (D. Yergin) – Stimulating economic growth and oil demand?


Crude oil prices, \$/boe




Average gas import prices, €/GJ




Primary energy production: Ref15




Primary energy supply: REF15




Gas imports: Ref15




Gas trade Russia to EU: REF15




Gas use by sector: Ref15




Electricity generation by fuel: Ref15




Domestic primary energy production: CheapGas versus REF15




Difference in gas imports: CheapGas versus REF15




Gas trade Russia to EU: CheapGas vs REF15




Difference in gas use by sector: CheapGas versus Ref15




Difference in electricity generation: CheapGas vs REF15




Difference in final energy: CheapGas versus Ref15




Domestic primary energy production: ExpensiveGas versus REF15




Difference in gas imports: ExpensiveGas versus REF15




Gas trade Russia to EU - ExpensiveGas




Gas trade Russia to EU ExpensiveGas vs REF15



Difference in gas use by sector: ExpensiveGas vs Ref15



Difference in electricity generation: ExpensiveGas vs REF15



Difference in final energy: ExpensiveGas vs Ref15

